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Abstract
This paper explores the truism that people think about what they say.
It proposes that, to satisfy their own goals, people often plan their speech
acts to affect their listeners' beliefs, goals, and emotional states. Such
language use can be modeled by viewing speech acts as operators in a
planning system, thus allowing both physical and speech acts to be
integrated into plans.
Methodological issues of how speech acts should be defined in a
plan-based theory are illustrated by defining operators for requesting and
informing. Plans containing those operators are presented and comparisons
are drawn with Searle's formulation. The operators are shown to be
inadequate since they cannot be composed to form questions (requests to
inform) and multi-party requests (requests to request). By refining the
operator definitions and by identifying some of the side effects of
requesting, compositional adequacy is achieved. The solution leads to a
meta-theoretical principle for modeling speech acts as planning operators.
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
2
1. Introduction
The Sphinx once challenged a particularly tasty-looking student of
language to solve the riddle: "How is saying 'My toe is turning blue,' as a
request to get off my toe, similar to slamming a door in someone's face?"
The poor student stammered that in both cases, when the agents are trying to
communicate something, they have analogous intentions. "Yes indeed,"
countered the Sphinx, "but what are those intentions?" Hearing no reply,
the monster promptly devoured the poor student and sat back smugly to wait
for the next oral exam.
Contemporary philosophers have been girding up for the next trek to
Giza. According to Grice (1957), the slamming of a door communicates the
slammer's anger only when the intended observer of that act realizes that
the slammer wanted both to slam the door in his face and for the observer to
believe that to be his intention. That is, the slammer intended the
observer to recognize his intentions. Slamming caused by an accidental
shove or by natural means is not a communicative act. Similarly, saying "My
toe is turning blue" only communicates that the hearer is to get off the
speaker's toe when the hearer has understood the speaker's intention to use
that utterance to produce that effect.
Austin (1962) has claimed that speakers do not simply produce sentences
that are true or false, but rather perform speech actions such as requests,
assertions, suggestions, warnings, etc. Searle (1969) has adapted Grice's
(1957) recognition of intention analysis to his effort to specify the
necessary and sufficient conditions on the successful performance of speech
acts. Though Searle's landmark work has led to a resurgence of interest in
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the study of the pragmatics of language, the intentional basis of
communicative acts requires further elaboration and formalization; one must
state for any communicative act, precisely which intentions are involved and
on what basis a speaker expects and intends those intentions to be
recognized.
The Sphinx demands a competence theory of speech act communication --
a theory that formally models the possible intentions underlying speech
acts. This paper presents the beginnings of such a theory by treating
intentions as plans and by showing how plans can link speech acts with
non-linguistic behavior. In addition, an adequacy test for plan-based
speech act theories is proposed and applied.
1.1 A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
Problem solving involves pursuing a goal state by performing a sequence
of actions from an initial state. A human problem-solver can be regarded as
"executing" a plan that prespecifies the sequence of actions to be taken.
People can construct, execute, simulate, and debug plans, and in addition,
can sometimes infer the plans of other agents from their behavior. Such
plans often involve the communication of beliefs, desires, and emotional
states for the purpose of influencing the mental states and actions of
others. Furthermore, when trying to communicate, people expect and want
others to recognize their plans and may attempt to facilitate that
recognition.
Formal descriptions of plans typically treat actions as operators,
which are defined in terms of applicability conditions, called
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preconditions, effects that will obtain when the corresponding actions are
executed, and bodies that describe the means by which the effects are
achieved. Since operators are representations, their preconditions,
effects, and bodies are evaluated relative to the problem-solver's model of
the world. We hypothesize that people maintain, as part of their models of
the world, symbolic descriptions of the world models of other people. Our
plan-based approach will regard speech acts as operators whose effects are
primarily on the models that speakers and hearers maintain of each other.
Any account of speech acts should answer questions such as:
- Under what circumstances can an observer believe that a speaker has
sincerely and successfully performed a particular speech act in producing an
utterance for a hearer? (The observer could also be the hearer or speaker.)
-What changes do the successful performance of a speech act make to the
speaker's model of the hearer, and to the hearer's model of the speaker?
- How is the meaning (sense/reference) of an utterance x related to the acts
that can be performed in uttering x?
To achieve these ends, a theory of speech acts based on plans should
specify at least the following:
- A planning system: a formal language for describing states of the world, a
language for describing operators, a set of plan construction inferences, a
specification of legal plan structures. Semantics for the formal languages
should also be given.
- Definitions of speech acts as operators in the planning system. What are
their effects? When are they applicable? How can they be realized in
words?
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As an illustration of this approach, this paper presents a simple
planning system, defines the speech acts of requesting and informing as
operators within that system, and develops plans containing "direct" acts of
requesting, informing, and questioning (which are requests to inform). We
do not, however, discuss how those speech acts can be realized in words.
We argue that a plan-based theory, unlike other proposed theories of
speech acts, provides formal adequacy criteria for speech act definitions:
given an initial set of beliefs and goals, the speech act operator
definitions and plan construction inferences should lead to the generation
of plans for those speech acts that a person could issue appropriately under
the same circumstances. This adequacy criterion should be used in judging
whether speech act definitions pass certain tests, in particular, the test
of compositionality. For instance, since a speaker can request that a
hearer do some arbitrary action, the operator definitions should show how a
speaker can request a hearer to perform a speech act. Similarly, since one
can inform a hearer that an action was done, the definitions should capture
a speaker's informing a hearer that a speech act was performed. We show how
a number of previous formulations of requesting and informing are
compositionally inadequate, and then develop definitions of informing that
can be composed into questions.
Another goal of this research is to develop meta-theoretical principles
that state how to formulate speech act definitions to pass these adequacy
tests. This paper proposes such a principle and shows how its application
leads to compositionally adequate definitions for multi-party requests (as
in "Ask Tom to open the door").
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
6
To simplify our problems in the early stages of theory construction,
several restrictions on the communication situation that we are trying to
model have been imposed:
- Any agent's model of another will be defined in terms of "facts" that the
first believes the second believes, and goals that the first believes the
second is attempting to achieve. We are not attempting to model
obligations, feelings, etc.
- The only speech acts we try to model are requests, informs, and questions
since they appear to be definable solely in terms of beliefs and goals.
Requesting and informing are prototypical members of Searle's (1976)
"directive" and "representative" classes, respectively, and are interesting
since they have a wide range of syntactic realizations, and account for a
large proportion of everyday utterances.
- We have limited ourselves to studying "instrumental dialogues" --
conversations in which it is reasonable to assume that the utterances are
planned and that the topic of discourse remains fixed. Typically, such
dialogues arise in situations in which the conversants are cooperating to
achieve some task-related goal (Deutsch, 1974), for example, the purchasing
of some item. The value of studying such conversations relative to the
structure of a task is that the conversants' plans can be more easily
formalized.
1.2 A Competence Theory of Speech Acts
At least two interdependent aspects of a plan-based theory should be
examined -- the plans themselves, and the methods by which a person could
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construct or recognize those plans. This paper will be concerned with
theories of the first aspect, which we shall term competence theories,
analogous to competence theories of grammar (Chomsky, 1965). A plan-based
competence theory of speech acts describes the set of possible plans
underlying the use of particular kinds of speech acts, and thus states the
conditions under which speech acts of those types are appropriate. Such
descriptions are presented here in the form of a set of operator definitions
(akin to grammatical "productions") and a specification of the ways in which
plans are created from those operators.
The study of the second aspect aims for a process theory, which
concerns how an ideal speaker/hearer chooses one (or perhaps more than one)
plan out of the set of possible plans. Such a theory would characterize how
a speaker decides what speech act to perform and how a hearer identifies
what speech act was performed by recognizing the plan(s) in which that
utterance was to play a part.
By separating out these two kinds of theoretical endeavors we are not
claiming that one can study speech act competence totally divorced from
issues of processing. On the contrary, we believe that for a (careful)
speaker to issue a particular speech act appropriately, she must determine
that the hearer's speech act recognition process(es) will correctly classify
her utterance. Thus, a competence theory would state the conditions under
which a speaker can make that determination -- conditions that involve the
speaker's beliefs about the hearer's beliefs, goals, and inferential
processes.
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Our initial competence theory has been embodied in a computer program
(Cohen, 1978) that can construct most of the plans presented here. Programs
often point out weaknesses, inconsistencies, and incorrect assumptions in
the statement of the competence theory, and can provide an operational base
from which to propose process theories. However, we make no claims that
computational models of plan construction and recognition are cognitive
process theories; such claims would require empirical validation.
Moreover, it is unclear whether there could be just one process theory of
intentional behavior since each individual might use a different method. A
more reasonable goal, then, is to construct computational models of speech
act use for which one could argue that a person could employ such methods
and converse successfully.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
The thread of the paper is the successive refinement of speech act
definitions to meet the adequacy criteria. First, we introduce in sections
2 and 3 the tools needed to construct plans: the formal language for
describing beliefs and goals, the form of operator definitions, and a set of
plan construction inferences.
As background material, section 4 summarizes Austin's and Searle's
accounts of speech acts. Then, Searle's definitions of the speech acts of
requesting and informing are reformulated as planning operators in section 5
and plans linking those speech acts to beliefs and goals are given. These
initial operator definitions are shown to be compositionally inadequate and
hence are recast in section 6 to allow for the planning of questions.
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Section 7 shows how the definitions are again inadequate for modeling the
plans for composed requests. After both revising the preconditions of
requests and identifying their side effects, compositional adequacy for
multi-party requests is achieved. The solution leads to a meta-theoretical
"point of view" principle for use in formulating future speech act
definitions within this planning system. Finally, section 8 discusses the
limitations of the formalism and ways in which the approach might be
extended to handle indirect speech acts.
2. On Models of Others
In this section, we present criteria that an account of one agent's
(AGT1) model of another's (AGT2's) beliefs and goals ought to satisfy. A
theory of speech acts need not be concerned with what is actually true in
the real world; it should describe language use in terms of a person's
beliefs about the world. Accordingly, AGT1's model of AGT2 should be based
on "believe" as described, for example, by Hintikka (1962; 1969). Various
versions of the concept "know" can then be defined to be agreements between
one person's beliefs and another's.
2.1 Belief
Apart from simply distinguishing AGT1's beliefs from his beliefs about
AGT2's beliefs, AGT1's belief representation ought to allow him to represent
the fact that AGT2 knows whether some proposition P is true, without AGT1's
having to know which of P or ~P it is that AGT2 believes. A belief
representation should also distinguish between situations like the
following:
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1. AGT2 believes that the train leaves from gate 8.
2. AGT2 believes that the train has a departure gate.
3. AGT2 knows what the departure gate for the train.
Thus, case 3 allows AGT1 to believe that AGT2 knows what the departure gate
is without AGT1's actually knowing which gate AGT2 thinks that is. This
distinction will be useful for the planning of questions and will be
discussed further in section 6.
Following Hintikka (1969), belief is interpreted as a modal operator A
BELIEVE(P), where A is the believing agent, and P the believed proposition.
This allows for an elegant, albeit too strong, axiomatization and semantics
for BELIEVE. We shall point out uses of various formal properties of
BELIEVE as the need arises.
A natural question to ask is how many levels of belief embedding are
needed by an agent capable of participating in a dialogue? Obviously, to be
able to deal with a disagreement, AGT1 needs two levels (AGT1 BELIEVE and
AGT1 BELIEVE AGT2 BELIEVE). If AGT1 successfully lied to AGT2, he would
have to be able to believe some proposition P, while believing that AGT2
believes that AGT1 believes P is false (i.e., AGT1 BELIEVE AGT2 BELIEVE AGT1
BELIEVE (~P)). Hence, AGT1 would need at least three levels. However,
there does not seem to be any bound on the possible embeddings of BELIEVE.
If AGT2 believes AGT1 has lied, he would need four levels. Furthermore,
Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972) have shown the ubiquity of mutual belief
in communication and face-to-face situations -- a concept that requires an
infinite conjunction of beliefs. Cohen (1978) shows how a computer program
that plans speech acts can represent beliefs about mutual beliefs finitely.
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2.2 Want
Any representation of AGT2's goals (wants) must distinguish such
information from: AGT2's beliefs, AGT1's beliefs and goals, and
(recursively) from AGT2's model of someone else's beliefs and goals. The
representation for WANT must also allow for different scopes of quantifiers.
For example, it should distinguish between the readings of "AGT2 wants to
take a train" as "There is a specific train that AGT2 wants to take" or as
"AGT2 wants to take any train." Finally, it should allow arbitrary
embeddings with BELIEVE. Wants of beliefs (as in "AGT1 WANTS AGT2 BELIEVE
P") become the reasons for AGT1's telling P to AGT2, while beliefs of wants
(i.e., AGT1 BELIEVES AGT1 WANTS P) will be the way to represent AGT1's goals
7
P. In modeling planning behavior, we are not concerned with goals that the
agent does not think he has, nor are we concerned with the subtleties of
"wish", "hope", "desire", and "intend" as these words are used in English.
The formal semantics of WANT, however, are problematic.
3. Models of Plans
In most models of planning (e.g., Fikes & Nilsson, 1971; Newell &
Simon, 1963), real world actions are represented by operators that are
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organized into plans. To execute a plan, one performs the actions
corresponding to the operators in that plan. An operator will be regarded
as transforming the planner's model of the world, the propositions that the
planner believes, in correspondence with the changes to the real world made
by the operator's associated action. An operator is applicable to a model
of the world in which that operator's preconditions hold. Operators can be
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
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defined in terms of others, as stated in their bodies (Sacerdoti, 1975).
The changes that an operator makes to the world model in which it is
evaluated to produce a new world model are called that operator's effects.
We shall view plans for an arbitrary agent S to be constructed using
(at least) the following heuristic principles of purposeful behavior:
At the time of S's planning:
1. S should not introduce in the plan actions whose effects S
believes are (or will be) true at the time the action is
initiated.
2. If E is a goal, an operator A that achieves E can be inserted
into the plan.
3. If an operator is not applicable in the planner's belief model,
all the preconditions of that operator that are not already
true can be added to the plan.
4. If the planner needs to know the truth-value of some
proposition, and does not, the planner can create a goal that
it know whether that proposition is true or false.
5. If the planner needs to know the value of some description
before planning can continue, the planner can create a goal
that it find out what the value is.
6. Everyone expects everyone else to act as described by these
principles.
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Heuristics 2 and 3 reflect an agent's reasoning "in order to do this I must
achieve that." Heuristics 4 and 5 imply that the planner does not have to
create an entire plan before executing part of it. Finally, because of
principle 6, agents can sometimes recognize the plans and goals of others.
Since agents can adopt others' goals (or their negations) as their own, they
can plan to facilitate or block someone else's plans. Bruce and Newman
(1978) and Carbonell (1978) discuss these issues at length.
The process of planning to achieve a goal is essentially a search
through this space of inferences to find a temporal sequence of operators
such that the first operator in the sequence is applicable in the planner's
current world model and the last produces a world model in which the goal is
true. A new world model is obtained by the execution of each operator.
3.1 The Form of Operators
Early approaches to problem-solving based on first-order logic (Green,
1969; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969) have emphasized the construction of provably
correct plans. Such approaches formalize the changes an action makes to the
state of the world model by treating an operator as a predicate one of whose
arguments is a state variable, which ranges over states of the world model.
Unfortunately, to be able to reason about what is true in the world after an
action is executed, one must give axiom schemata that describe which aspects
of the state of the world are not changed by each operator. For instance,
calling someone on the telephone does not change the height of the Eiffel
Tower. This thorny "frame problem" (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969) occurs because
individual states of the world are not related to one another a priori.
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To overcome this problem, Fikes and Nilsson (1971) in their STRIPS
planning system assume that all aspects of the world stay constant except as
described by the operator's effects and logical entailments of those
effects. Such an assumption is not formalized in the reasoning system,
making it difficult to prove the correctness of the resulting plans.
Nevertheless, it has become the standard assumption upon which to build
problem-solvers. We too will make it and thus shall describe an operator's
jo
effects by the propositions that are to be added to the model of the world.
All operator schemata will have two kinds of preconditions -- "cando"
and "want" preconditions. The former, referred to as CANDO.PRs, indicate
proposition schemata that, when instantiated with the parameter values of an
operator instance, yield propositions that must be true in the world model
for that operator instance to be applicable. We do not discuss how they can
be proven true. The "want" precondition, henceforth WANT.PR, formalizes a
principle of intentional behavior -- the agent of an action has to want to
do that action.
The following example serves to illustrate the form of such
definitions.
MOVE(AGT,SOURCE,DESTINATION)
CANDO.PR: LOC(AGT,SOURCE)
WANT.PR: AGT BELIEVE AGT WANT move-instance
EFFECT: LOC(AGT, DESTINATION)
The parameters of an operator scheme are stated in the first line of the
definitions and it is assumed that values of those parameters satisfy the
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
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appropriate selectional restrictions, (here, a person, and two locations,
respectively). The WANT.PR uses a parameter "move-instance" that will be
filled by any instance of the MOVE operator schema that is currently being
planned, executed, or recognized. The CANDO.PR states that before an agent
can move from the SOURCE location, he must be located there. The EFFECT of
the MOVE indicates that the agent's new location is the DESTINATION.
S's plan to achieve goal G is pictured schematically in Figure 1 (P and
Q are arbitrary agents, Al and A2 are arbitrary actions). Instead of
indicating the entire state of the planner's beliefs after each operator,
those propositions that are effects of an operator and are preconditions of
some other operator in the plan are presented.
This diagram illustrates the building block of plans - given goal G, S
applies an inference of type 2 and selects operator Al, whose agent is Q, as
a producer of that effect. That operator is applicable when preconditions
Ci and Cj hold and when agent Q wants to perform Al. Type 3 inferences
allow each of the preconditions to be achieved by other actions (e.g., A2),
which may be performed by another agent (e.g., P). This chaining of
operators continues until all preconditions are satisfied. Plan diagrams
are thus read from top to bottom.
To indicate that this schematic is part of agent S's plan, the plan
components are "embedded" in what S BELIEVE S WANTs. The truth or falsity
of preconditions is evaluated with respect to S's beliefs. For example,
verifying the WANT.PR of operator Al (i.e., Q BELIEVE Q WANT Q do Al) would
involve establishing that S BELIEVE Q BELIEVE Q WANT Q do Al. If Q is the
same person as S (i.e., S is planning her own action Al) then this condition
16
S BELIEVE S WANT:
G
t effect
0 do Al want.pr QBELIEVE QWANTQdoA1
cando.p cando.pr effect
Ci Cj
I effect
P do A2
Figure 1. A schematic of S's plan to achieve G
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is trivially true sine  Al is already part of Ss plan, and since for all
agents R, we assume that if R BELIEVE (P) then R BELIEVE R BELIEVE (P)o
However, if Q is not the same as S, the WANToPR also needs to be achieved,
leading, as we shall see, to S's planning a speech act.
4o Speech Acts
4o.1 Austin's Performatives
Austin (1962) notes a peculiar class of declarative utterances, which
he termed performatives, that do not state facts but rather constitute the
performance of an action. For instance saying, "I hereby suggest you leave"
is an act of suggesting, Unlike the usual declaratives, such sentences are
not true or false, but rather are subject to the same kinds of failures
("infelicities") as non-linguistic actions -- such as being applied in the
wrong circumstances or being performed insincerelyo
Generalizing further, Austin claims that in uttering any sentence, one
performs three types of speech acts. the locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionarP acts. A speaker performs a locutosnary act by making noises
that are the uttering of words in a language satisfying its vocabulary and
grammar, and by the uttering of sentences with definite meaning (though
perhaps having more than one)o Such acts are used in the performance of
1i9ocutionary acts which are those acts performed in making utteranceso For
instance, stating requesting, warning, ordering, and apologizing are claimed
to be different types of illocutionary acts, each of which is said to have a
unique illocutionarv force that somehow characterizes the nature of the act°
Each illocutionary act contains p~rQositional content that specifies what is
being requested, warned about, ordered, etco
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New distinctions, however, bring new problems. Frequently, when
performative verbs are not used, the utterance's illocutionary force is not
directly interpretable from its content. For example, to understand the
force of the utterance "The door", the hearer may need to use his beliefs
that the door is currently closed, that the speaker has two arm-loads of
groceries, and that he wants to be on the other side of the door, in
determining that the speaker has requested that the door be opened.
Furthermore, a speaker may appear to be performing one illocutionary act,
and actually may be trying to use it to do something else. Thus, "We have
to get up early tomorrow" may simply be an assertion, but, when said at a
party, may be intended as an excuse to the host for leaving, and may be
intended as a request that the hearer leave. Such indirect speech acts
(Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1975) are the touchstone of any theory of
speech acts.
The last major kind of act identified by Austin is the perlocutionary
act -- the act performed by making an utterance. For instance, with the
illocutionary act of asserting something, I may convince my audience of the
truth of the corresponding proposition (or insult or frighten them).
Perlocutionary acts produce perlocutionary effects: convincing produces
belief and frightening produces fear. While a speaker often has performed
illocutionary acts with the goal of achieving certain perlocutionary
effects, the actual securing of those effects is beyond his control. Thus,
it is entirely possible for a speaker to make an assertion, and for the
audience to recognize the force of the utterance as an assertion and yet not
be convinced.
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4.2 Speech Acts a la Searle
Searle (1969) presents a formulation of the structure of illocutionary
acts (henceforth referred to simply as speech acts) by suggesting a number
of necessary and sufficient conditions on their successful performance. He
goes on to state rules corresponding to these conditions, for a speaker's
using any "indicator of illocutionary force" to perform a particular speech
act.
As an example, let us consider Searle's conditions for a speaker S, in
uttering T, to request that some hearer H do action A. The conditions are
grouped as follows:
- Normal Input/Output Conditions
These include such conditions as: H is not deaf and S is not mute,
joking, or acting.
- Propositional Content Conditions
Literal speech acts only use propositions of certain forms. The
restrictions on these forms are stated in the propositional content
conditions. For a request, the proposition must predicate a future act of
H.
- Preparatory Condition
A preparatory condition states what must be true in the world for a
speaker to felicitously issue the speech act. For a request, the
preparatory conditions include:
- H is able to do A.
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- S believes H is able to do A.
- It is not obvious to S and H that H will do A in the normal course of
events (the "non-obviousness" condition).
Searle claims the non-obviousness condition is not peculiar to
illocutionary acts. This paper will support his claim by showing how the
condition can be applied more generally to rational, intentional behavior.
- Sincerity Condition
A sincerity condition distinguishes a sincere performance of the speech
act from an insincere one. In the case of a request, S must want H to do A;
for a promise, S must intend to do the promised action; for an assertion, S
must believe what he is asserting.
- Essential Condition
An essential condition specifies what S was trying to do. For a
request, the act is an attempt to get H to do A.
- Force Condition (our terminology)
The purpose of the force condition is to require that the speaker utter
a speech act only if he intends to communicate that he is performing that
act. "Intending to communicate" involves having certain intentions
regarding how the hearer will recognize the force of the utterance. The
basic idea is that it is intended that the hearer recognize that the speaker
is trying to bring about the satisfaction of the essential condition. For a
request this amounts to the speaker's wanting the hearer to realize the
speaker intends for him to do A.
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5. A First Reformulation of Searle's Conditions
Searle (1969) unfortunately does not supply justifications for the
adequacy of his definitions for various kinds of speech acts. A primary
goal of this paper is to show how a plan-based theory provides the basis for
such adequacy criteria by allowing one to see clearly hew changes in speech
act definitions affect the plans that can be generated.
A second, more specific point of this formulation exercise is to show
which of Searle's conditions are better regarded as pertaining to more
general aspects of intentional behavior than to particular speech acts. In
this spirit, we show how the sincerity condition, which we shall argue is a
misnomer, and the propositional content and "non-obviousness" conditions
arise during the course of planning. Concerning the remaining conditions,
we assume the "normal input/output conditions", but have chosen not to deal
with the force condition until we have a better understanding of the plans
for speech acts and how they can be recognized. The remaining conditions,
the preparatory and essential conditions, will be mapped into the formalism
as the preconditions and effects of speech act operators.
5.1 First Definition of REQUEST
Searle claims the preparatory conditions are required for the "happy"
performance of the speech act - where "happy" is taken to be synonymous with
Austin's use of "felicitous". Austin was careful to distinguish among
infelicities, in particular, misapplications (performing the act in the
wrong circumstances) and flaws (incorrectly performing the act). We take
Searle's preparatory conditions as conditions guaranteeing applicability
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rather than successful performance, allowing them to be formalized as
preconditions. Thus if an operator's preconditions are not satisfied when
it is performed, then the operator was "misapplied". Before expressing
preconditions in a formalism, a systematic "point of view" must be adopted.
Since the applicability conditions affect the planning of that speech act,
the preconditions are stated as conditionsi on the speaker's beliefs and
goals. Correspondingly, the effects describe changes to the hearer's mental
state. We establish a point of view principle, that is intended to be a
guideline for constructing speech act definitions in this planning system,
namely, preconditions begin with "speaker believe" and effects with "hearer
believe".
Let us consider Searle's preparatory conditions for a request: H is
able to do ACT, and S believes H is able to do ACT. From our discussion of
belief, it should be clear what H can in fact do, i.e., what the real world
is like, is not essential to the success of a request. What may be relevant
is that S and/or H thinks H can do ACT. To formalize "is able to do A", we
propose a predicate CANDO(Q,ACT) that is true if the CANDO.PR's of ACT are
true (with person Q bound to the agent role of ACT).
The essential condition, which is modeled as the EFFECT of a REQUEST,
is based on a separation of the illocutionary act from its perlocutionary
effect. Speakers, we claim, cannot influence their hearers' beliefs and
goals directly. The EFFECTs of REQUEST are modeled so that the hearer's
actually wanting to do ACT is not essential to the successful completion of
the speech act. Thus, the EFFECT is stated as the hearer's believing the
speaker wants him to do the act. For important reasons, to be discussed in
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Section 5.7, this formulation of the essential condition will prove to be a
major stumbling block.
The operator REQUEST from SPEAKER to HEARER to do action ACT, which
represents a literal request, can now be defined as:
REQUEST(SPEAKER,HEARERACT)
CANDO.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT
AND
SPEAKER BELIEVE
HEARER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT
WANT.PR SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT request-instance
EFFECT: HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT ACT
5.2 Mediating Acts and Perlocutionary Effects
To bridge the gap between REQUESTs and the perlocutionary effect for
which they are planned, a mediating step named CAUSE-TO-WANT is posited,
that models what it takes to get someone to want to do something. Our
current analysis of this "act" trivializes the process it is intended to
model by proposing that to get someone to want to do something, one need
only get that person to know that you want them to do it.
The definition of an agent's (AGT1) causing another agent (AGT) to want
to do ACT is:
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CAUSE-TO-WANT(AGT1 ,AGT,ACT)
CANDO.PR: AGT BELIEVE
AGT1 BELIEVE AGT1 WANT ACT
EFFECT: AGT BELIEVE AGT WANT ACT
The plan for a REQUEST is now straightforward. REQUEST supplies the
necessary precondition for CAUSE-TO-WANT (as will other act combinations).
When the WANT.PR of some action that the speaker is planning for someone
else to perform is not believed to be true, the speaker plans a REQUEST.
For example, assume a situation in which there are two agents, SYSTEM (S)
and JOHN, who are located inside a room (i.e., they are at location INROOM).
Schematically, to get JOHN to leave the room by moving himself to location
OUTROOM, the plan would be as in Figure 2. Notice that the WANT.PR of the
REQUEST itself, namely
S BELIEVE
S WANT
REQUEST(S,JOHN,MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM))
is trivially true since that particular REQUEST is already part of S's plan.
The CANDO.PR's of the REQUEST are true if S believes JOHN is located INROOM
and if it believes JOHN thinks so too. Thus, once the planner chooses
someone else, say H, to do some action that it believes H does not yet want
to do, a directive act (REQUEST) may be planned.
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S BELIEVE S WANT:
LOC(JOHN) = OUTROOM
I effect
LOC(JOHN) = INROOM cando.pr MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)
want.pr
JOHN BELIEVE
JOHN WANT MOVE(JOHNINROOM,OUOOMOOM) +
I effect
CAUSE-TO-WANT(S,JOHN,MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM))
cando.pr
JOHN BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
S WANT MOVE(JOHN, INROOM, OUTROOM)I effect
S BELIEVE
JOHN C
MOVE
S BELIEVE
LOC(JOI
E-uv-l r REQUEST(S.JOHN, MOVE(JOHN,INROOM.OUTROOM))
ANDO
(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)
E cando.pr
HN) = INROOM
S BELIEVE JOHN BELIEVE
JOHN CANDO MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)
S BELIEVE JOHN BELIEVE
LOC(JOHN) = INROOM
Figure 2. A plap for a REQUEST.
,d«nltn nr
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5.3 Comparison with Searle's Conditions for a REQUEST
Searle's "non-obviousness" condition for the successful performance of
a request stated that it should not be obvious to the speaker that the
hearer is about to do the action being requested, independently of the
request. If that were obvious to the speaker, the request would be
pointless. However, as Searle noted, the non-obviousness condition applies
more generally to rational, intentional behavior than to speech acts alone.
In our formalism, it is the WANT.PR of the act being requested (goal "++" in
Figure 2). If the planning system believed the WANT.PR were already true,
i.e., if it believed that John already wanted to leave the room, then the
plan would proceed no further; no REQUEST would take place.
Searle's "sincerity" condition stated that the speaker had to want the
requested act to be performed. The sincerity condition in the plan of
Figure 2 is the goal labeled "+". The speaker's wanting the hearer to move
is the reason for planning a REQUEST.
Notice also that the propositional content of the REQUEST, a future act
to be performed by the hearer, is determined by prior planning -- i.e., by a
combination of that act's WANT.PR, the mediating act CAUSE-TO-WANT, and by
the EFFECT of a REQUEST. Searle's propositional content condition thus
seems to be a function of the essential condition (which is approximated by
the EFFECTs of the speech act operator), as Searle claimed. So far, we have
factored out those aspects of a request that Searle suggested were
eliminable. Future revisions will depart more significantly.
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5.4 Definition of INFORM
The speech act of informing is represented by the operator INFORM,
which is defined as a speaker's stating a proposition to a hearer for the
purpose of getting the hearer to believe that the speaker believes that
proposition to be true. Such acts will usually be planned on the basis of
wanting the hearer to believe that proposition. For a SPEAKER to INFORM a
HEARER that proposition PROP is true, we have:
INFORM(SPEAKER, HEARER, PROP)
CANDO.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE PROP
WANT.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE
SPEAKER WANT inform-instance
EFFECT: HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE PROP
The CANDO.PR simply states that the only applicability condition to
INFORMing someone that proposition PROP is true is that the speaker believes
PROP. The EFFECT of an INFORM is to communicate what the speaker believes.
This allows for the hearer to refuse to believe the proposition without
invalidating the speaker's action as an INFORM. Therefore, an intermediate
"act", termed CONVINCE, is necessary to get the hearer to believe the
proposition.
For a person AGT1 to CONVINCE another person AGT that proposition PROP
is true, we define:
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CONVINCE(AGT1, AGT, PROP)
CANDO.PR: AGT BELIEVE
AGT1 BELIEVE PROP
EFFECT: AGT BELIEVE PROP
This operator says that for AGT1 to convince AGT of the truth of PROP
AGT need only believe that AGT1 thinks PROP is true. Though this may be a
necessary prerequisite to getting someone to believe something, it is
clearly not sufficient. For a more sophisticated precondition of CONVINCE,
one might state that before AGT will be convinced, she needs to know the
justifications for AGT1's belief, which may require that AGT believe (or be
CONVINCEd of) the justifications for believing those justifications, etc.
Such a chain of reasons for believing might be terminated by mutual beliefs
that people are expected to have or by a belief AGT believes AGT1 already
has. Ideally, a good model of CONVINCE would allow one to plan persuasive
arguments.
5.5 Planning INFORM Speech Acts
The planning of INFORM speech acts now becomes a simple matter. For
any proposition PROP, S's plan to achieve the goal H BELIEVE PROP would be
that of Figure 3. Notice that it is unnecessary to state as a precondition
to INFORM, that the hearer H does not already believe PROP. Again, this
non-obviousness condition that can be eliminated by viewing speech acts in a
planning context.
What would be Searle's sincerity condition for the INFORM above (S
BELIEVE PROP) turns out to be a precondition for the speech act rather than
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S BELIEVE S WANT:
H BELIEVE PROP
effect
CONVINCE (S,H,PROP)
Scando.pr
H BELIEVE S BELIEVE PROP
Seffect
INFORM (S,H,PROP).
Scando.pr
S BELIEVE PROP
Figure 3. A plan for an INFORM
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a reason for planning the act as we had for REQUEST's sincerity condition,
(i.e., SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT HEARER do ACT). If we were to use
REQUEST as a model, the sincerity condition for an INFORM would be SPEAKER
BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT HEARER BELIEVE PROP. One may then question whether
Searle's sincerity condition is a consistent naming of distinctive features
of various kinds of speech acts. Insincerity is a matter of falsely
claiming to be in a psychological state, which for this model is either
belief or want. By this definition, both conditions, SPEAKER BELIEVE PROP
and SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT HEARER BELIEVE PROP, are subject to
insincerity.
5.6 Planning an INFORM of a WANT
As stated earlier, there are other ways to satisfy the precondition to
CAUSE-TO-WANT. Since REQUEST was taken as a prototypical directive act, all
members of that class share the same EFFECT (Searle's (1976) "illocutionary
point"). However, issuing an INFORM of a WANT, as in "I want you to do X",
also achieves it. Another plan to get John to move appears in Figure 4.
The initial stages of this plan are identical to that of Figure 2
through the CANDO.PR of CAUSE-TO-WANT. This precondition is achieved by an
INFORM whose propositional content is S WANT MOVE(JOHN, INROOM, OUTROOM).
In this instance, the planning system does not need to proceed through
CONVINCE, since an INFORM of a WANT produces the necessary effects. Testing
the CANDO.PR of INFORM determines if the system believes this proposition,
which it does since the MOVE by John is already one of its goals. The
WANT.PR of INFORM is trivially true, as before, and thus the plan is
complete.
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S BELIEVE S WANT:
LOC(JOHN) INROOM cando.pr
S BELIEVE cando.pr
S WANT
MOVE(JOHNINROOM,OUTROOM)
LOC(JOHN) = OUTROOM
t effect
MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)
I want.pr
JOHN BELIEVE
JOHN WANT MOVE(JOHN,INROOMOUTROOM)I effect
CAUSE-TO W ANT(S,JOHN,MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM))
Scando.pr
JOHN BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
S WANT MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)
I effect
INFORM(S,JOHN,S WANT(MOVE(JOHN,INROOM,OUTROOM)))
Figure 4. A plan for an INFORM of a WANT
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5.7 REQUEST vs. INFORM of WANT
Searle claimed that the conditions he provided were necessary and
jointly sufficient for the successful and non-defective performance of
various illocutionary acts. Any behavior satisfying such a set of
conditions was then said to be a particular illocutionary act. Thus, if two
utterances have the same illocutionary force, they should be equivalent in
terms of the conditions of their use. We believe that the two utterances
"please open the door" and "I want you to open the door (please)" can have
the same force as directives, differing only in their politeness. That is,
they both can be planned for the same reasons. However, our treatment does
not equate the literal speech acts that could realize them when they should
be equated. The condition on REQUEST that distinguishes the two cases is
the precondition SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT. Since
there is no corresponding precondition in the plan for the INFORM of a WANT,
there is no reason to check the hearer's beliefs.
In order to force an equivalence between a REQUEST and an INFORM of a
WANT, various actions need to be redefined. We shall remove the above
condition as a CANDO.PR from REQUEST and add it as a new CANDO.PR to
CAUSE-TO-WANT. In other words, the new definition of CAUSE-TO-WANT would
say that you can get a person to decide to want to do some action if she
believes you want her to do it and if she believes she can do it. With
these changes, both ways of getting someone to want to do some action would
involve her believing she is able to do it. More formally, we now define:
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
33
REQUEST (SPEAKER, HEARER, ACT)
CANDO.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT
WANT.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT request-instance
EFFECT: HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT ACT
and
CAUSE-TO-WANT (AGT1, AGT, ACT):
CANDO.PR: AGT BELIEVE
AGT1 BELIEVE AGT1 WANT ACT
AND
AGT BELIEVE AGT CANDO ACT
EFFECT: AGT BELIEVE AGT WANT ACT
Though REQUEST and INFORM of a WANT can achieve the same effect, they
are not interchangeable. A speaker (S), having previously said to a hearer
(H), "I want you to do X," can deny having the intention to get H to want to
do X by saying "I simply told you what I wanted, that's all." However, it
appears to be much more difficult, after having requested H to do X, to deny
the intention of H's wanting to do X by saying "I simply requested you to do
X, that's all." S usually plans a request for the purpose of getting H to
want to do some act X by means of getting H to believe that S wants H to do
it. While maintaining the distinction between illocutionary acts and
perlocutionary effects, thus allowing for the possibility that H could
refuse to do X, we need to capture this distinction between REQUEST and
INFORM of WANT. The solution (Allen, 1979; Perrault & Allen, forthcoming)
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lies in formulating speech act bodies as plans achieving the perlocutionary
effect -- plans that a hearer is intended to recognize.
In the next two sections, we investigate the compositional adequacy of
these operator definitions via the planning of REQUESTs that a hearer
perform REQUEST or INFORM speech acts.
6. Compositional Adequacy: Questions
We are in agreement with many others, in proposing that questions be
treated as requests for information. In terms of speech act operators, the
questioner is performing a REQUEST that the hearer perform an INFORM. That
is, the REQUEST leads to the satisfaction of INFORM's "want precondition."
However, for a wh-question, the INFORM operator, as defined earlier, cannot
be used since the questioner does not know the full proposition of which he
is to be informed. If he did know what the proposition was, there would be
no need to ask; he need only decide to believe it.
Intuitively, one plans a wh-question to find out the value of some
expression and a yes/no question to find out whether some proposition is
true. Such questions are planned, respectively, on the basis of believing
that the hearer knows what the value of that expression is or that the
hearer knows whether the proposition is true, without the speaker's having
to know what the hearer believes.
Earlier we stated that a person's (AGT1) belief representation should
represent cases like the following distinctly:
1) AGT2 believes the Cannonball Express departs at 8 p.m.
2) AGT2 believes the Cannonball Express has a departure time.
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3) AGT2 knows what the departure time for the Cannonball Express is.
Case 1 can be represented by a proposition that contains no variables. Case
2 can be represented by a belief of a quantified proposition - i.e.,
AGT2 BELIEVE (
3x (the y : DEPARTURE-TIME(CANNONBALL-EXPRESS,y)) = x)
However, Case 3 can be approximated by a quantified belief, namely,
3x AGT2 BELIEVE
(the y : DEPARTURE-TIME(CANNONBALL-EXPRESS,y)) = x),
where "the y : P(y)", often written "iy P(y)", is the logical description
operator read "the y which is P". This formula is best paraphrased as
"There is something which AGT2 believes to be the departure time for the
Cannonball Express." Typical circumstances in which AGT1 might acquire such
quantified beliefs are by understanding a definite description uttered by
AGT2 referentially (Donnellan, 1966). Thus, if AGT2 says "the pilot of TWA
461 on July 4", AGT1 might infer that AGT2 knows who that pilot is.
Quantified beliefs often become goals when a planner needs to know the
values of the parameters of an operator and when these parameters occur in
that operator's preconditions. We show how, when a quantified belief is a
goal for AGT, AGT can plan a wh-question.
6.1 Planning Wh-Questions
First, a new operator, INFORMREF, and its associated mediating act
CONVINCEREF, are needed.'1
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INFORMREF(SPEAKER.HEARER, XxDx) (ie. D is a predicate of one argument)
CANDO.PR: 3 y SPEAKER BELIEVE (ixDx)=y
WANT.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT informref-instance
EFFECT: 3 y HEARER BELIEVE SPEAKER BELIEVE (ixDx)=y
Thus, before a speaker will inform a hearer of the value of some
description, there must be some individual that the speaker believes is the
value of the description, and the speaker must want to say what it is. The
effect of performing this act is that there is then some individual that the
hearer thinks the speaker believes to be the value of the description. As
usual, we need a mediating act to model the hearer's then believing that
individual to be the value of the description. To this end, we define
AGT1's convincing AGT of the referent of the description as:
CONVINCEREF(AGT1,AGT, XxDx)
CANDO.PR: 3y AGT BELIEVE AGT1 BELIEVE (ixDx)=y
EFFECT: 3y AGT BELIEVE (ixDx)=y
Using these operators, if the planning system wants to know where Mary
is and believes that Joe knows where she is, it can create the plan
underlying the question "Where is Mary?" as shown in Figure 5.
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SBELIEVE SWANT:
3 JOE BELIEVE cando.pr
(iyLOC(MARY,y) x
4pE BELIEVE cando.pr
5x JOE BELIEVE
(iyLOC(MARY,y) x)
S BLIEVE cando.pr
3x JOE BELIEVE
(iyLOC(MARY,y) x)
3 x S BELIEVE (iyLOC(MARY,y) = x)Seffect
CONVINCEREF (JOE,S,Ay LOC(MARYy))I cando.pr
3 x S BELIEVE JOE BELIEVE (iyLOC(MARY,y) = x)t effect
INFORMREF(JOE,S,XyLOC(MARY,y))
want.pr
JOE BELIEVE
JOE WANT INFORMREF(JOE,SyLOC(MARY,y))t effect
CAUSE-TO-WANT(S,JOE,INFORMR EF(JOE,S
S -can-.r XyLOC(MARY,y)))
cando.pr
JOE BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
SWANT INFORMREF(JOE,S, .yLOC(MARY,y))I effect
REQUEST(S,JOE,INFORMREF(JOE,S, Xy LOC(MARY,y)))
Figure 5. A plan for a wh-question
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After the system plans for Joe to tell it Mary's location, on the basis of
believing that he knows where she is, it must get Joe to want to perform
this act. In the usual fashion, this leads to a REQUEST and hence the
construction of a question. The precondition to CAUSE-TO-WANT, namely, JOE
BELIEVE JOE CANDO the INFORMREF is actually:
JOE BELIEVE
3y JOE BELIEVE
ixLOC(MARY,x)=y
which is implied by
3y JOE BELIEVE ixLOC(MARY,x)=y
which was asserted, for this example, to be one of the planning system's
beliefs. Notice, that the planning of this question depends upon the
system's having chosen Joe to tell it the answer, and upon its having chosen
itself to get Joe to want to perform the INFORM. Section 7 discusses what
happens when different decisions are made.
6.2 Plans for Yes/No Questions
To plan a yes/no question about some proposition P, one should think
that the hearer knows whether P is true or false (or, at least "might
know"). An approximate representation of AGT2's knowing whether P is true
or false is OR (AGT2 BELIEVE P, AGT2 BELIEVE ~P)).9 Such goals are often
created, as modeled by our type 4 inference, when a planner does not know
the truth-value of P. Typical circumstances in which an agent may acquire
such disjunctive beliefs about another are telephone conversations, in which
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AGT1 believes that there are certain objects in AGT2's view. AGT1 then
probably believes that AGT2 knows whether certain visually derivable (or
easily computable) properties of those objects are true, such as whether
object A is on top of object B.
To accommodate yes/no questions into the planning system, a third
INFORM, called INFORMIF, and its associated mediating act CONVINCEIF, are
defined as follows:
INFORMIF(SPEAKER,HEARER.P)
CANDOPR: OR(SPEAKER BELIEVE P, SPEAKER BELIEVE ~P)
EFFECT: OR(HEARER BELIEVE SPEAKER BELIEVE P,
HEARER BELIEVE SPEAKER BELIEVE "P)
WANT.PR SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT informif-instance
CONVINCEIF( AGT.AGT1. P)
CANDO.PR: OR(AGT BELIEVE AGT1 BELIEVE P,
AGT BELIEVE AGT1 BELIEVE ~P)
EFFECT: OR(AGT BELIEVE P, AGT BELIEVE ~P)
The plan for a yes/no question to Joe is now parallel to that of a
wh-question. That is, in the course of planning some other act, if the
system wants proposition P to be true or to be false, and if the truth-value
of proposition P is unknown to it, it can create the goal OR(SYSTEM BELIEVE
P, SYSTEM BELIEVE ~P). For instance if P were LOC(MARY,INROOM), the
illocutionary acts underlying the question to Joe "Is Mary in the room?"
can be planned provided the planning system believes that Joe either
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believes P is true or he believes P is false. That disjunctive belief could
be stated directly or could be inferred from a belief like
3y JOE BELIEVE(ixLOC(MARY,x))=y -- i.e., there is something Joe believes is
Mary's location. But if it had some idea where Joe thought Mary was, say
OUTROOM, then it would not need to ask.
6.3 Summary
A plan for a question required the composition of REQUEST and INFORM
and led to the development of two new kinds of informing speech acts,
INFORMREF and INFORMIF, and their mediating acts. The INFORMREF acts lead
to "what", "when", and "where" questions while INFORMIF results in a yes/no
question. The reason for these new acts is that, in planning a REQUEST that
someone else perform an INFORM act, one only has incomplete knowledge of
their beliefs and goals; but an INFORM, as originally defined, can only be
planned when one knows what is to be said.
7. Compositional Adeauacy and the Point of View Principle
Earlier, a guiding "Point of View Principle" (POVP) for defining speech
acts as planning operators was proposed: the preconditions of the operator
should be stated from the speaker's point of view, i.e., in terms of the
speaker beliefs; the effects should be stated from the hearer's point of
view. We now wish to judge the adequacy of speech act definitions
formulated along these lines. The test case will be the composing of
REQUESTs; i.e., the planning of a REQUEST that some third party himself
perform a REQUEST. For instance, the utterance "Ask Tom to tell you where
the key is?" is an example of such a third party request.
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The current definitions of speech acts will be shown to be
compositionally inadequate since they force speakers to have unnecessary
knowledge about intermediaries' beliefs. However, achieving compositional
adequacy requires more than a simple restatement of the point of view
principle; the side effects of speech act operators must also be
considered.
Our scrutiny will be focused upon the seemingly innocent precondition
to REQUEST, SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT whose form depended on the
POVP. The goal is to show how the POVP leads us astray and how a
formulation of that precondition according to a new POVP that suggests a
more neutral point of view for speech act definitions sets us back on
course. From here on, the two versions of the precondition will be referred
to as the "speaker-based" and "neutral" versions.
7.1 Plans for Multi-party Speech Acts
Multi-party speech acts can arise in conversations where communication
is somehow restricted so as to pass through intermediaries. The planning
system, since it is recursive, can generate plans for such speech acts using
any number of intermediaries provided that appropriate decisions are made as
to who will perform what action.
Let us suppose that the planning system wants to know where a
particular key is and that it must communicate through John. We shall use
the speaker-based precondition on REQUEST for this example, and for
readability, the following abbreviations:
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SYSTEM -- S TOM -- T JOHN -- J
BELIEVE -- B WANT -- W LOC(KEY23,y) -- D(y)
Figure 6 shows the plan for the specific three party speech act underlying
"Ask Tom to tell me where the key is".
S develops the plan in the following fashion: T is chosen to tell S
the key's location since, we shall assume, he is believed to know where it
is. Since T is not believed to already want to tell, and since S cannot
communicate directly with T (but T can communicate with S), J is chosen to
be the one to talk T into telling. Since J is not believed to already want
to do that, S plans a REQUEST that J perform a REQUEST, namely
REQUEST(S,J,REQUEST(J,T,INFORMREF(T,S,AyLOC(KEY23,y)))). J, then, is an
intermediary who is just expected to do what he is asked; his status will
be discussed soon.
The preconditions that need to be satisfied in this plan are:
S BELIEVE:
(P1) 3 y T BELIEVE [ixLOC(KEY23,x)=y]
(P2) T BELIEVE (P1) (implied by Pl)
(P3) J BELIEVE (P1)
(P4) J BELIEVE J BELIEVE (P1) (implied by P3)
(P5) S BELIEVE J BELIEVE (P1) (implied by P3)
While the plan appears to be straightforward, precondition P3 is
clearly unnecessary -- S ought to be able to plan this particular speech act
without having any prior knowledge of the intermediary's beliefs. This
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S BELIEVE SWANT:
3 x TB(iyD(y) = x
(P1)
TB T CANDO
INFORMREF(T,S, )P(y))
.--.-.
TB 3x TB (iyD(y) = x)
(P2)
JB 3 x TB(IyD(y) = x)
(P3)
cando.pr
cando.pr
cando.pr
JB J CANDO
REOUEST(J,T, cando.pr
INFORMREF(T,S. ip(y))) -
JB JB 3x TB(iyD(y) » x)
(P4)
SB J CANDO
REQUEST
3 x SB(iyD(y) = x)Seffect
CONVINCEREF(T,S,AyD(y))
I cando.pr
3x SB TB(iyD(y) = x
I effect
INFORMREF(T,S.XyD(y))
I want.pr
TB TW INFORMREF(T,S,AyD(y))t effect
CAUSE-TO-WANT(J,T,IN FORMREF(T,SAyD(y)))
I cando.pr
TB JB JW
INFORMREF(T,S,XyD(y))
I effect
REQUEST(J.T,INFORMREF(T,,. AyD(y)))
Swant.pr
JB JW REQUEST(J,T,INFORMREF(TS. yD(y)))Seffect
CAUSE-TO-WANT(S,J.REQUEST(J,T,
| INFORMREF(TS.AyD(y))))
cando.pr
JB SB SW
REQUEST (JT.INFORMREF(T,S. XyD(y)))
I effect
REQUEST(S,J,REQUEST(J,TINFORMREF(T.S.AyD(y))))
(J,T,INFORMREF(T,S, ).(y)))
SB JB 3x TB(iyD(y) = x)
(P5)
Figure 6. A plan for a third party REQUEST.
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constructed by composing REQUEST's precondition schema with precondition P3,
and P3 is similarly constructed from P1.
The problem can be eliminated by reformulating REQUEST's precondition
as HEARER CANDO ACT. Consider a general plan for three party REQUESTs, as
in Figure 7. T's INFORMREF has been generalized to "ACT(T)" whose
precondition is "P".
The preconditions that have to be satisfied in S's plan are:
S BELIEVE:
(P1) P (also P3 and P5)
(P2) T BELIEVE (P)
(P4) J BELIEVE (P)
Conditions P3 and P5 are the same as P1, and thus the preconditions to
the REQUESTs in the plan are independent of the speaker's beliefs; they
depend only on the planner's beliefs. While the use of the neutral
precondition eliminates prior knowledge requirements for REQUESTs per se,
condition P4  still requires, as a precondition to CAUSE-TO-WANT, that the
planner have some knowledge of the intermediary's beliefs. The next section
shows why the planner need not have such beliefs at the time of plan
construction.
7.2 Side Effects
The performance of a speech act has thus far been modeled as resulting
in an EFFECT that is specific to each speech act type. But, by the very
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SBELIEVE SWANT:
(P1) P .cando.pr
T BELIEVE
T CANDO ACT(T)
(P2) T BELIEVE (P)
(P3) T CANDO ACT(T)
P
cando.pr
cando.pr
cando.pr
(P4) J BELIEVE
J CANDO REQUEST(J,T.ACT(T)))
JBELIEVE (P)
(P5) J CANDO cando.pr
REQUEST(J,T,ACT(T)))
P
ACT(T)
I want.pr
T BELIEVE
T WANT(ACT(T))
I effect
CAUSE-TO WANT(JT,ACT(T)))
I cando.pr
T BELIEVE
J BELIEVE
J WANT ACT(T)
effect
REQUEST(J,T,ACT(T))
Swant.pr
J BELIEVE
J WANT REQUEST (J,T,ACT(T))
t effect
CAUSE -TO-WANT(S,J,REQUEST(J,T,ACT(T))
I cando.pr
J BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
S WANT(REQUEST(J,TACT(T))
effect
REQUEST(S.J,REOUEST(J.T.ACT(T)))
Figure 7. A third party REQUEST using the "neutral"
precondition.
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fact that a speaker has attempted to perform a particular speech act, a
hearer learns more -- on identifying which speech act was performed, a
hearer learns that the speaker believed the various preconditions in the
plan that led to that speech act held. The term side effect will be used to
refer to the hearer's acquisition of such beliefs by way of the performance
of a speech act. Since the plan the hearer infers for the speaker depends
upon his beliefs about the speaker's beliefs and goals, the side effects of
a speech act cannot be specified in advance. However, the hearer is
minimally entitled to believe the speaker thought her speech act's
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preconditions held (Bruce, 1975; Bruce & Schmidt, Note 1). Furthermore,
not only do hearers make such assumptions about speakers' beliefs, but
speakers know that, and often depend on those assumptions for the success of
their plans. Figure 8 is a schematic of a simple plan by S to REQUEST H to
do action ACT that illustrates this situation.
The minimal side effect is that the hearer believes the speaker
believes the precondition of the REQUEST holds, i.e. that HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT. This goal satisfies, via a CONVINCE, the
CANDO.PR of CAUSE-TO-WANT, and hence the REQUEST achieves two goals in the
plan. The schematic can be applied twice in Figure 7 to obtain Figure 9.
After the side effects of J's REQUEST to T take hold, T would think J
believes the preconditions to J's REQUEST (P) obtain. We claim that it is
because T thinks that J believes P that T comes to believe P. In this way,
precondition P2 is satisfied as a result of J's REQUEST. Naturally, the
side effect argument applies equally to J as the hearer of S's REQUEST.
That is, J comes to believe P (precondition P4) because he thinks S believes
P. S's belief that the preconditions to action A hold thus gets "passed"
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S BELIEVE S WANT:
p cando.pr ACT(H)
want.pr
H BELIEVE H WANT ACT(H)
effect
.cando.pr CAUSE TO:WANT (S.HACT(H))
H CANDO ACT(H)
I effect
CONVINCE(SH,H CANDO ACT(H))
cando.pr
candoi.'r
H BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
S WANT ACT(H)
effect
H BELIEVE side effect REQUEST(S,H,ACT(H))
S BELIEVE H CANDO ACT(H) -"I" -
Figure 8. A REQUEST with side effects.
4H BELIEVE
· ~c-------------
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SBELIEVE SWANT:
cando.pr ACT(T)
Swant.pr
T BELIEVE
T WANT(ACT(T))
effect
T BELIEVE
T CANDO ACT(T)
T BELIEVE(P)
t effect
CONVINCE(J,T,P)
I cando.pr
T BELIEVE J BELIEVE(P)
P .4
cando.pr
side effect
cando.pr
J BELIEVE
J CANDO REQUEST(J,T.ACT(T)) cando.pr
-4
J BELIEVE (P)
I effect
CONVINCE(S,J,P)
Scando.pr
J BELIEVE S BELIEVE(P) side effect
CAUSE-TO WANT(J,T,ACT(T))Scando.pr
T BELIEVE
J BELIEVE
J WANT ACT(T)Seffect
REQUEST(J,TACT(T))
I want.pr
J BELIEVE
J WANT REQUEST(J,T,ACT(T))
Seffect
CAUSE-TO-WANT(S,JREQUEST(J,T,ACT(T))
cando.pr
J BELIEVE
S BELIEVE
S WANT(REQUEST(J,T,ACT(T)))
effect
REQUEST(S,J.REQUEST(JT,ACT(T)))
cando.pr
Figure 9. A third party REQUEST using the "neutral"
precondition and side effects.
cando.pr
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down the line of intermediaries, whatever its length, to the final agent of
A. In this way S can issue the third party REQUEST without having any prior
knowledge of J's beliefs about P; S's REQUEST provides all the necessary
information!
An interesting aspect of this transmission is that, while J may come to
believe P and, by making a REQUEST to T, transmit this belief, T's belief
that P may be of little use to T. Consider Figure 9 again. Suppose P were
3y T BELIEVE (ixLOC(KEY23,x))= y,
which we are loosely paraphrasing as T knows where the key is, S's REQUEST
conveys S's belief that T knows where the key is. Though J, to decide to
perform his REQUEST, need only think that T knows where the key is, T
actually has to know where it is before he can do A. J's conveying his
belief does no good since he has supplied information for a CONVINCE, but T
needs information sufficient for a CONVINCEWH. A planning system has to be
able to realize this and to plan, by making the same choices as before, the
additional REQUEST that John perform an INFORM, e.g., "Tell Tom that the key
is in the closet." ~
7.3 A New Point of View Principle
In addition to considering side effects for speech acts, we are led to
propose a new point of view principle:
The "CANDO" preconditions and the effects of speech
acts should be defined in a way that does not depend on
who the speaker of that speech act is. That is, no
CANDO.PR or EFFECT should be stated as a proposition
beginning with "SPEAKER BELIEVE".
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The CANDO.PRs of speech acts defined according to this principle not only
resolve our difficulties with composite speech acts, but they also behave as
desired for the usual non-composite cases since preconditions now depend only
on the planner's beliefs, and the planner is often the speaker. Thus speech
act operator definitions are intimately bound to the form of the planning
system.
The only result the new principle has on the form of the EFFECTs of
speech acts is to make clear whose beliefs should be updated with those
EFFECTs. After successfully executing a speech act to H, the speaker can
update his model of H with the speech act's EFFECTs. But, for a composite
speech act ultimately directed to H, the initial planner must observe or
assume the success of the rest of the multi-party plan in order to conclude
that the EFFECTs of the final speech act to H hold.
While the new principle guarantees that the EFFECTs of speech acts are
independent of the use of intermediaries, hearers have every right to believe
that the speakers of those speech acts believe that the preconditions hold.
Because side effects are stated in terms of the hearer's beliefs about the
speaker's beliefs, intermediaries are vulnerable to a charge of insincerity
if they brazenly execute the speech acts they were requested to perform. It
is to avoid such a charge, and thus make intermediaries "responsible for" the
speech acts they execute, that we place the condition on CAUSE-TO-WANT
stating that AGT BELIEVE AGT CANDO ACT.
Finally, to complete the reexamination of speech act definitions, we
point out that the WANT.PR also has a SPEAKER BELIEVE on it. One cannot, in
the spirit of "housecleaning", remove the SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT from
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the WANT.PR of speech acts since a speaker's goal
independently of the speaker's beliefs, unless one
someone's "unconscious" goals. We are not.
7.4 New Definitions of REQUEST and INFORM
Using this principle, REQUEST is redefined as:
REQUEST(SPEAKER HEARER .ACT)
cannot be characterized
is willing to model
CANDO.PR:
WANT.PR:
EFFECT:
HEARER CANDO ACT
SPEAKER BELIEVE
SPEAKER WANT request-instance
HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT ACT
The principle, applied to the definition of the operator INFORM, results
in a CANDO.PR stated as PROP rather than as SPEAKER BELIEVE PROP. Such a
change allows one to plan to request an intermediary, say a child, to tell
someone else that the key is in the closet without the planner's having to
believe, at the time of planning, that the child thinks so. The new
definition of INFORM then becomes:
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INFORM(SPEAKER,HEARER,PROP)
CANDO.PR: PROP
WANT.PR: SPEAKER BELIEVE
SPEAKER WANT inform-instance
EFFECT: HEARER BELIEVE
SPEAKER BELIEVE PROP
Regarding the other informing speech acts, the principle cannot be used
to justify deleting the SPEAKER BELIEVE from the CANDO.PR of INFORMREF and
INFORMIF since the highest elements of those conditions are " " and "OR",
respectively. Intuitively speaking, this is a sensible result since a
speaker SP cannot plan for an intermediary INT to tell H whether P is true,
or what the value of description D is unless INT is believed to have that
information.
7.5 Summary
The appropriate planning of composite speech acts has turned out to be a
powerful test of the adequacy of speech act definitions. To meet its demands
on the planning of questions and multi-party speech acts, two new speech
acts, INFORMREF and INFORMIF, have been defined, and the preconditions to
REQUEST and INFORM have been reformulated according to a point of view
principle. Since these last two speech acts were taken to be prototypes of
Searle's (1976) "directive" and "representative" classes, the principle will
find wide application.
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A side effect of direct requests was identified and used in planning
multi-party speech acts. Side effects, however, cannot be calculated until
the hearer has recognized the speaker's plan and thus has classified the
observed utterance as a particular speech act type. Thus the minimal side
effect formulation given here should be further justified on the basis of
what a hearer needs to assume about the speaker's beliefs in order to
identify an utterances's illocutionary force.
There may be other ways to meet compositional adequacy. For instance,
one could state explicitly that an action's preconditions should be true at
the time the action is to be done (Bruce, 1975). For our multi-party
REQUESTS, such an approach (using a speaker-based precondition) produces
preconditions like: S believes J will believe P will be true when ACT is to
be done, which seems reasonable. However, the minimal side effect of S's
REQUEST then becomes: J now believes that (before that REQUEST) S expected J
to believe that P would be true when ACT is done (where "now" is just after
the REQUEST was made). As yet, we do not have an analogue of CONVINCE that
would allow J to then come to believe that P would be true. Again, if
REQUEST is defined using the neutral precondition, this problem does not
arise.
8. Concluding Remarks
It has been argued that a theory of speech acts can be obtained by
modeling them in a planning system as operators defined, at least, in terms
of the speakers' and hearers' beliefs and goals. Thus, speech acts are
treated in the same way as physical acts, allowing both to be integrated into
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plans. Such an approach suggests new areas for application. It may provide
a more systematic basis for studying real dialogues arising in the course of
a task -- a basis that would facilitate the tracking of conversants' beliefs
and intentions as dialogue and task proceed. A similar analysis of
characters' plans has also been shown (Bruce & Newman, 1978) to be essential
to a satisfactory description of narrative. Finally, Allen (1979) and Cohen
(1978) have suggested how computer conversants might plan their speech acts
and recognize those of their users.
Given this range of application, the methodological issues of how speech
acts should be modeled in a planning system become important. Specifically,
a plan-based competence theory, given configurations of beliefs and goals,
speech act operators, and plan construction inferences should generate plans
for all and only those speech acts that are appropriate in those
configurations. This paper developed tests that showed how various
definitions of the speech acts of requesting and informing were inadequate,
especially to the demand that they generate appropriate plans when composed
with other speech acts to form questions and multi-party requests.
To resolve the difficulties, two "views" of INFORM to be used in
constructing questions were defined, allowing the questioner to have
incomplete knowledge of the hearer's beliefs. After revising both the form
of speech act preconditions and identifying some speech act side effects,
compositional adequacy for multi-party REQUESTS was achieved. The solution
led to a meta-theoretical "point of view" principle for use in defining
future speech acts as operators within this planning system.
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Our a.pproach has both assumed certain idealized properties of
speaker/hearers and has been restricted in its scope. The preconditions and
effects of our operators are stated in the language of logic, not because of
any desire to perform logically valid inferences, but because the conditions
in the plans should have well-defined semantics. While this has been
partially realized through the adoption of the possible-worlds semantics for
belief, the semantics is too strong to be a faithful model of human beliefs.
For instance, it leads here to requiring a questioner to have very strong,
though incomplete, knowledge of the hearer's beliefs. To reflect human
beliefs more accurately, one needs to model (at least): degrees of belief,
justifications, the failure to make deductions, inductive leaps, and knowing
what/who/where something is. These refinements, though needed by a theory of
speech acts are outside its scope. Finally, the semantics for WANT and a
strictly formal semantics for actions are lacking (but see (Moore, 1979) for
an interesting approach to the latter).
Only two kinds of speech acts, prototypes of Searle's (1976) directive
and representative classes, have been examined here, but the approach can be
extended to other members of those classes (Bruce, 1975) and perhaps to the
commissive class that includes promises. However, in order to model promises
and warnings, a better understanding of the concepts of benefit and
obligation is necessary.
Finally, we have discussed how a planning system can select
illocutionary force and propositional content of a speech act, but not how
utterances realizing it can be constructed nor how illocutionary acts can be
identified from utterances. Extending the plan-based approach to the first
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area means investigating the extent of pragmatic influence on linguistic
processing. An important subproblem here is the planning of referring
expressions involved in performing illocutionary acts (Perrault & Cohen, in
press; Searle, 1969). Regarding speech act identification, the acid-test of
a plan-based approach is its treatment of indirect speech acts (Searle,
1975). Gordon and Lakoff (1971) proposed "Conversational Postulates" to
account for the relation between the direct or literal and the indirect
illocutionary forces of an utterance. But, as Morgan (1977) notes, by
calling them postulates, one implies they cannot be explained by some other
independently motivated analysis.
We suggest that the relation between direct and indirect readings can be
largely accounted for by considering the relationship between actions, their
preconditions, effects, and bodies, and by modeling how language users can
recognize plans, which may include speech acts, being executed by others.
The ability to recognize plans is seemingly required in order to be helpful,
independent of the use of indirect speech acts. For instance, hearer's often
understand a speaker's utterance literally but go beyond it, inferring the
speaker's plans, and then performing acts that would enable the speaker's
higher level goals to be fulfilled. Indirect speech acts arise because
speakers can intend hearers to perform helpful inferential processing and
they intend for hearers to know this. Allen (1979) and Perrault and Allen
(Note 2) formalize this process of intended plan-recognition (and thus
Searle's force condition), extending our plan-based approach to the
interpretation of indirect speech acts.
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Footnotes
1. See also Strawson (1964) and Schiffer (1972).
2. Our approach was inspired by Bruce and Schmidt (1974) and Bruce
(1975). This paper can be viewed as supplying methodological foundations for
the analyses of speech acts and their patterned use that they present.
3. Though this could perhaps be an empirical criterion, it will be used
intuitively here.
4. The representations used by Meehan (1976), and Schank and Abelson
(1977) do not, in a principled way, maintain the distinctions mentioned here
for belief or want.
5. The following axiom schemata will be assumed:
B.1 aBELIEVE(all axioms of the predicate calculus)
B.2 aBELIEVE(P) => aBELIEVE(aBELIEVE(P))
B.3 aBELIEVE(P) OR aBELIEVE (Q) => aBELIEVE(P OR Q)
B.4 aBELIEVE(PandQ) <=> aBELIEVE(P) & aBELIEVE(Q)
B.5 aBELIEVE(P) => ~aBELIEVE(~P)
B.6 aBELIEVE(P => Q) => (aBELIEVE(P) => aBELIEVE(Q))
B.7 3x aBELIEVE(P(x)) => aBELIEVE(3x P(x))
B.8 all agents believe that all agents believe B.1 to B.7
These axioms unfortunately characterize an idealized "believer" who can make
all possible deductions from his beliefs and doesn't maintain contradictory
beliefs. Clearly, the logic should be weakened. However, we shall assume
the usual possible worlds semantics of BELIEVE in which the axioms are
satisfied in a model consisting of a universe U, a subset A of U of agents, a
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set of possible worlds W, and initial world WO in W, a relation R on the
cross-product A x W x W, and for each world- w and predicate P, a subset Pw of
U called the extension of P in w.. The truth functional connectives and, or,
not, and => have their usual interpretations in all possible worlds.
aBELIEVE(P) is true in world w if P is true in all worlds wl such that R(a',
w,wl), where a' is the interpretation of a in w. 3 x P(x) is true in world w
if there is some individual i in U such that P(x) is true in w when all free
occurrences of x in P are interpreted as i.
6. Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972) talk only about mutual knowledge,
but the extension to mutual belief is obvious.
7. This also allows a third place to vary quantifier scope, namely:
3x a BELIEVE a WANT P(x)
a BELIEVE 3x a WANT P(x),
a BELIEVE a WANT 3xP(x)
8. One usually generalizes' operators to operator schemata in
correspondence with types of actions; operator instances are then formed by
giving values to the parameters of an operator schema. Since only operator
instances are contained in plans we will not distinguish between the operator
schema and its- instances unless necessary. The same schema/instance,
type/token distinction applies as well to speech acts modeled as planning
operators.
9. We are bypassing; the fact that people need to observe the success or
failure of their actions before being able to accurately update their
beliefs. The formalism thus only deals with operators and models of the
world rather than actions and the real world. Operators names will be
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capitalized while their corresponding actions will be referred to in
lower-case.
10. Those propositions that need to be deleted (or somehow made
"invisible" in the current world model) will not be discussed here.
11. This does not violate our modeling just one person's view since a
speaker, after having issued a speech act, will update his beliefs to include
the effects of that speech act, which are defined in terms of the hearer's
beliefs.
12. This should be weakened to "...are true or are easily achievable"
i.e. if Q can plan to make them true.
13. The agent who creates plans will often be referred to as SYSTEM,
which should be read as "planning system".
14. Other preconditions to the INFORM act could be added -- for
instance, to talk to someone one must have a communication link (Schank and
Abelson, 1977); which may require telephoning or going to that person's
location, etc. However, such preconditions would apply to any speech act,
and hence probably belong on the locutionary act of making noises to someone.
15. Without a specification of the justifications for a belief, this
operator allows one to become convinced of the truth of one's own lie. That
is, after speaker S lies to hearer H that P is true, and receives H's
acknowledgement indicating H has been convinced, S can decide to believe P
because he thinks H thinks so. Further research needs to be done on CONVINCE
and BELIEVE to eliminate such bizarre behavior.
16. Another conjunct can be added to the representation of 3), as
suggested by Allen (1979), to refine our representation of "AGT2's knowing
what the value of the description is", namely:
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ix [(the y=: D(y) = x & AGT2 BELIEVE ((the y: D(y)) =x)]
We shall, however, use the simpler quantified belief formulation.
17. We would prefer to to formalize declaratively that "the agent of an
action must know the values of the parameters of the action". One way of
doing this is suggested by Moore (1979).
18. In Cohen (1978), we achieved the same effect by parameterizing
INFORM and CONVINCE so that different sets of preconditions and effects were
used if the original goal was a quantified belief. In addition, Cohen did
,not use descriptions. We believe the formulation that follows, due to James
Alen, is clearer. The actual names for these acts were suggested by Bill
;Woods.
19. Allen (1979) also points out that another conjunct can be added to
the representation of "knowing whether" as a disjunctive belief, to obtain (P
& AGT2 BELIEVE (P) OR- ("P & AGT2 BELIEVE (~P)).
20. Searle (1969) suggested there were different speech acts for real
,and teacher-student (or exam) questions, where in the latter case, the
ýquestioner just wants to know what the student thinks is the answer. Since
teadcher-sutdent questions seem to have similar conditions on their
appropriateness as real questions, save the questionet's intention to be
ebnvinced, we have good reason for factoring the mediating acts out of each
of the three INFORM act types. This leaves the INFORM acts neutral with
respect to what kind of question they are contained in. In general, if the
perlocutionary effects of an INFORM were incorporated into the act's
definition, then we would need two new primitive teacher-student question
speech acts. For now, we opt for the former.
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21. The language for stating operators needs to be extended to account
for "which", "how", and "why" questions. For instance, "why" and "how"
questions involve quantifying over actions and/or plans.
22. For instance, in the Stanford Research Institute Computer-based
Consultant research (Deutsch, 1974), communication between an expert and an
apprentice was constrained in this way. The apprentice issued such speech
acts, while the expert did not.
23. The hearer may in fact believe those preconditions are false.
24. The simple backward-chaining planning algorithm described in (Cohen,
1978) could not easily construct this plan since it ignores intermediate
states of the world model that would be created after each operator's
execution (i.e., after S's, and J's, REQUESTs).
25. T cannot obtain that information from believing P since
3y T BELIEVE ixLOC(KEY23,x) = y cannot be inferred from
T BELIEVE 3y T BELIEVE ixLOC(KEY23,x) = y, by B.2 and B.7 (footnote 5).
If CONVINCE can be defined so that AGT1 cannot be convinced by AGT2 that AGT1
believes something, then J could not CONVINCE T that 3y T BELIEVE
ixLOC(KEY23,x) = y on the basis of T's thinking that J believes it.
26. The side effects again figure in this additional three-party REQUEST
- John comes to believe that the key is in the closet by believing that S
thinks so.
27. The fact that a WANT.PR is found on every intentional act, makes us
suspect that it belongs on some single "element" that is present for every
act.
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28. Of course, what must be satisfied in any plan for INFORM is that the
planner believe PROP.
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